Global economic integration is often viewed as a process orchestrated from 'above' by constituents of an emergent transnational class. Yet such perspectives neglect the autonomous contributions made from 'below' by subnational political coalitions that mediate between global and local interests. In this article we consider the issue of political mobilization at the subnational scale around the material and discursive interests of mobile capital. We highlight the mechanisms that mediate the tension between global and local interests and examine how this tension is articulated at multiple scales. We draw on empirical work in the United States and United Kingdom to illustrate the complex translation between 'global' capital and 'local' political coalitions. We conclude by sketching out the implications of our discussion for research on the role of political coalitions in fostering modernization through inward investment and upon some of the attendant policy implications.
Introduction
Critical interrogations of globalization warn against positioning international economic integration as a novel, natural and inexorable process (Cox, 1997; Dicken et al., 1997) . Nevertheless, the speed of economic integration, a shift in bargaining power from states to firms and the rise of international organizations and the political autonomy they exercise are commonly seen to have contributed to the emergence of new sites of rule and law-making such that nation-states have become increasingly fragmented policymaking arenas permeated by the transnational networks of multinational corporations in particular (Held and McGrew, 2002) .
For some, these new sites of power and authority have become the preserve of an emergent transnational capitalist class (TCC) (Sklair, 1997 (Sklair, , 2001 . The associated implication is that the political orchestration of processes of globalization is best viewed largely as a top-down phenomenon-the power of transnational capital manifest in the likes of a generalized model of (neoliberal) economic development and regulatory reform produced and circulated among transnational elites and faithfully reproduced at national and local scales. In this view, subnational and even national interests are firmly beholden to a process operating 'above' and beyond their sphere of authority. In this article we critique this view, arguing instead that processes of international economic integration are orchestrated by a complex array of interests that operate at a diversity of scales. One important subset is that of subnational territorial coalitions that translate between the interests and ideologies of transnational capital and more local sets of interests and agents. The more 'bottom-up' nature to this activity indicates that, while the international and national context surely shape the actions and terms of reference of subnational institutions, the latter also make their own distinctive contribution to processes of international economic integration. Moreover, the complexity of processes of globalization, and the mediation of inward investment in particular, renders problematic the ready assignment of interests to particular spatial scales and corresponding claims of displacement of one particular geographic scale by another. Instead, it may be fruitful to move towards a framework that embraces and fully engages the multiscalar nature of political and economic interests. In this article we examine the orchestration of globalization by subnational territorial coalitions whose concrete focus is in mediating inward investment and whose interests are realized in translating between what Sklair terms the TCC (Sklair, 1997) on the one hand, and traditional local and regional coalitions of interest on the other.
1 In serving to translate between scales these territorial coalitions are firmly multiscalar in nature harnessing interests of broader and lesser geographic extent. Yet rather than see them as disparate and diffuse, mobilized only in order to mediate particular inward investments, these coalitions maintain an organizational coherence that ensures some stability in the translation between global and local interests. Given this we term these coalitions as 'inward investment regimes'.
We stress throughout that the process is one of translation rather than the simple assertion of the interests of transnational capital in a multitude of different local contexts. The notion of translation suggests that the interests of agents constituted at different geographical scales are only relatively autonomous from one another. Conceptualized in this fashion the scalar structuring of interests is seen to involve a complex set of relationships between different actors that neither conflates their interests on the one hand nor maintains them as wholly distinct and separate on the other.
We begin by establishing the need to consider the subnational dimension to the translation of transnational class interests. The subnational dimension is distinctive due to the uneven impact of the different mechanisms through which transnational material and ideological practices are transmitted and the autonomy of institutions constituted at subnational scales. This is the first sense in which something is lost in translation-since the interests of transnational capital are modified when translated 1 We use the term inward investment to register a concern with potentially mobile direct investments rather than the merger and acquisition process that also constitutes an important part of direct investment flows. In the UK, inward investment is now largely synonymous with foreign direct investment. In the US, a significant proportion of 'inward' investment into any region or State remains composed of the domestic investments of firms as they expand or relocate economic functions within the US. to local arenas. We then highlight the limits of traditional analyses of local coalitions in the specific case of inward investment-based territorial coalitions, where there are important national differences in the way in which agents and collections of agents translate transnational interests and ideologies into local arenas. Here, there is a second sense in which something is lost in translation-given the inability of concepts developed in one context, notably the United States (US), to fully capture the dynamics of the politics of inward investment in ostensibly similar contexts such as the United Kingdom (UK). Finally, there is a third broader sense of being lost in translation-since the multiscalar and inter-organizational nature of subnational coalitions centred on inward investment poses significant analytical challenges. Throughout the article we provide empirical illustrations primarily from the heartland 'competition states' (Cerny, 1997) of the current neoliberal economic policy orthodoxy-the UK and the US. Our empirical examples draw upon existing literature but also upon original empirical material. 
Translating from the global to the local
Sklair's concept of the TCC (Sklair, 1997 (Sklair, , 2001 ) is arguably the most notable of a number of theories of a global ruling class or elite which provide a means of understanding global economic integration as a politically constructed process. Sklair speaks of an identifiable TCC, composed of four class fractions as follows: executives of TNCs, globalizing bureaucrats, globalizing politicians and professionals, and consumerist elites within the retail and media sectors. For Sklair the TCC is 'ever more or less in control of the process of globalisation' and is 'beginning to act as a transnational dominant class in some spheres' (Sklair, 2001, p. 5) . Here, Sklair stresses the definitive existence of this class, its autonomy from national political and economic processes and its role in orchestrating the internationalization of production. While 'much of the power of business elites can be . . . related more to their class position than to their organisational capacities' (Peck, 1995, p. 27 ) the idea of a TCC suggests that this structural power is compounded in the case of globally mobile (or potentially mobile) capital, especially in relation to its power relative to nation-states (Stopford and Strange, 1991 ). Yet such claims are, at best, over-generalized and the idea of a TCC has been subject to significant criticism. There are two points that are especially pertinent to the concerns of this article. The first is the question of the commonality of interests within the TCC. It might be tempting to associate the TCC with the spread of global neoliberalism as if this represented a single uniform ideological project. As Van der Pijl (cited in Robinson and Harris, 2000) notes, processes of global economic integration led by finance capital have manifested themselves in liberal and cosmopolitan ideology. However, Sklair's definition of the TCC is drawn broadly in order to speak to the internationalization of productive capital (manufacturing and non-financial services) 2 The empirical materials are drawn from a number of research projects conducted by the authors over a 10-year period, primarily addressing inward investment in Ohio (US), Wales and the north-east of England but also in East Asia and East Africa. Collectively, the projects have involved over 130 interviews with employees of firms and public and private sector organizations with an interest in economic development.
and, as Van der Pijl suggests, the discursive and material practices of a global class serving this particular fraction of capital tend to centre on national and subnational economic and physical planning rather than the promulgation of a universal neoliberalism.
A second important criticism, and one that forms the analytical point of departure for this article, centres on the extent to which national and subnational scales are seen as bearers of transnational capital's generalized structural power to impose its material and ideological interests. Sklair makes a distinction between globalizers and localizers but fails, it seems, to fully recognize the implications of his own examples of where the latter identify with the former. Here, then it becomes apparent that this scalar distinction is in reality less clear since 'the boundaries of the TCC are indeterminate. At what point national classes become transformed into transnational classes is open to question' (Robinson and Harris, 2000, p. 32) 3 and consideration of national and subnational class fractions becomes an important focus of study in considering TCC formation and the globalization of production. As Paul has recently noted, 'subnational states are emergent sites of global regulation in being the structural location at which social alliances between transnational capital and locally constituted classes and class fractions are forged' (Paul, 2002, p. 468) .
In the remainder of this section we argue for a focus on the processes through which transnational interests are translated into and articulated within local political arenas. In particular, we explore (a) the actors promoting convergence; (b) the referents around which convergence in welfare and regulatory models may or may not be taking place; and (c) the conflicting mechanisms of transference. In doing so we highlight the geographically uneven nature to any convergence process and the complex scalar arrangement of actors involved in the inward investment regimes that serve to translate interests between scales.
2.1. Actors in the process of translation For some, common cultural imperatives have long generated a high degree of isomorphism in the development of states and societies. However, such world models 'have become especially important in the post-war era as the cultural and organizational development of world society has intensified at an unprecedented rate' (Meyer et al., 1997, p. 145) . Chief among actors promoting such isomorphism are private sector businesses; however, the notion of a TCC also draws attention to a range of other actors that may at least be partially aligned to the interests of transnational capital. And at the outset we might note that many of these actors need not themselves be transnational although their actions and interests may be shaped by transnational relationships (Nye and Keohane, 1971) .
Private sector businesses are more important in the diffusion of global business regulation than is often appreciated (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000) . The significance of businesses as actors stems in no short measure from the structural nature of their political power (Peck, 1995, p. 27 ) manifesting itself in the appearance of, what Lindblom (1977, p. 202) terms, a 'circularity of control'. The scope for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to shape the global business regulatory environment has expanded as the number, size and geographic scope of such enterprises has grown markedly since 1945. At this point, it is as well to remember that domestic businesses are also able to exert influence and engage in the process by which transnational interests are translated into local arenas through processes of regulatory arbitrage. Crotty et al. (1998) argue that the effect of multilocational firms in diffusing international norms and practices is greater than often realized since it is gross mobility of capital (i.e. realized and non-realized threats of the re-location of production) rather than just net mobility of capital that highlights the true extent of regulatory arbitrage.
It is also tempting to regard International Organizations (IOs) such as the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the World Trade Organization (WTO) as actors possessing structural power as part of a TCC. Certainly, as the number of such IOs has multiplied (from 50 in 1914 to over 600 by 1980; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000, p. 485 ) their influence on the globalization of regulation has grown. However, as we have detailed elsewhere, the norms associated with and diffused by such IOs have changed over time as has the geographical extent and impact of their interventions (Phelps, Power and Wanjiru, in press) .
In describing the role of professional organizations in the process of globalization, Meyer et al. argue that world society is mainly made up of what may . . . be called "rationalized others": social elements such as the sciences and professions . . . that give advice to nation states and other actors about their true and responsible natures, purposes, technologies, and so on. Rationalized others are now everywhere, in massive arrays of international associations . . . and epistemic communities . . . generating veritable rivers of universalistic scientific and professional discourse. (Meyer et al., 1997, p. 162) However, as one might imagine, these professional associations harness diverse interests and often have an uneven geographical impact.
Professionals such as management and location consultants, merchant bankers and accountants have been particularly important in helping to propagate territorial ideologies centred on inward investment. Managerialist discourses have 'become a part of the background hum of business around the world' (Thrift, 1999, p. 38) . One interviewee noted that location consultants and the like combine their own expertise (often accumulated from previous interactions with clients) with that derived from specific clients [Interview 1]. As another interviewee described:
Most of these consultants' experiences in helping corporates decide where to locate-they use that experience to turn it around and say 'we've worked with all these companies, we understand the way that they think, and what they are looking for'. So they put that back on you and say 'well this is why you didn't get the project and this is what you need to do to improve yourselves'. [Interview 2] Managerialist discourses are one manifestation of what Thrift calls the 'cultural circuit of capital' which pervades not just the business world but the international, national and local institutions of governance with which businesses engage, much like the way in which accounting practices have become integral to a governmentality of modern capitalism extending deep into public sector organizations (Miller and O'Leary, 1993) . Universities and academics may also play an important role in the promulgation of territorial ideologies. 4 Yet these professions also vary in the extent of their participation in the scalar translation of interests. So, for example, although international accountancy, merchant bank and consultancy firms are important intermediaries in the location decisions of investors, their penetration of different continental let alone national markets varies markedly (Phelps, Power and Wanjiru, in press ).
Elected local politicians are, perhaps, uniquely important in shaping elements of ideology, translating transnational interests according to the specifics of particular territories and coordinating bureaucratic machineries. As Paul notes, '"Globalizing politicians" . . . are . . . criticial to the integration of key offices and agencies of the subnational state with the transnational capitalist class' (Paul, 2002, p. 475) . To the very public activities of the likes of Mayors we can also add the 'anonymous leadership' provided by chief executive officers of local governments. In general, they 'increasingly serve and are expected to serve as discrete local political advisors and entrepreneurs' (Klausen and Magnier, 1998, p. 283) harnessing the bureaucratic machinery internal to local governments with local networks of relations encompassing the public, voluntary and business sectors.
The machinery of local public sector regulatory organizations such as local governments also appears to have been changed as a consequence of interactions with transnational actors such as MNEs, and local actors that have enlarged their spheres of engagement [such as investment promotion agencies (IPAs) and local politicians]. Both the practice of prospecting for inward investors and servicing investors through 'after-care' involve regular interaction and coordination with other public and quasipublic organizations such as IPAs through which prevalent norms are transmitted. This often appears as acquiescence by public sector organizations to the 'inevitability' of globalization and associated inter-locality competition.
Referents of convergence on neoliberalism
If the interests of transnational capital were singularly undifferentiated and if they were faithfully represented in local arenas in a top-down manner then we would expect a process of convergence among national models of welfare and business regulation. However, neither of these conditions holds. First, there is no general or generic interest of 'transnational capital' and second, interests are only translated into local arenas through a process of mediation in which some form of modification or distortion occurs. Accordingly, we can begin to think of the process of interest translation and the associated activities of inward investment regimes in relation to several referents around which convergence upon neoliberal national and local modes of regulation and interest representation may be taking place. Hay (2004, p. 245 ) identifies several such referents: 'input convergence' (convergence in pressures and challenges to which governments are exposed); 'paradigm convergence' (convergence in policy orthodoxies and the cognitive filters through which policy options are understood); 'policy convergence' (convergence in policies pursued); 'convergence in legitimatory rhetoric' (convergence in ideas used to legitimate policies); and 'outcome convergence' (convergence in the outcomes of policies).
Actors involved in inward investment regimes play their major role in terms of process convergence, policy convergence and legitimatory convergence-translating a degree of 'input convergence' into 'output convergence' in Hay's terminologyalthough some, as transnational actors, also contribute to 'input convergence'. In what follows we provide some empirical examples of the manner in which IPAs in neoliberal competition states like the US and UK have assumed important roles in legitimatory convergence.
The example of the north-east of England highlights how specific ideologies associated with inward investment have been mobilized. The north-east region came to the fore as a location for Japanese and East Asian FDI in the late 1980s and early 1990s. An unassailable territorial ideology surrounding the transformative potential of such investment appears to have been promulgated at this time (Garrahan and Ritchie, 1999; Ritchie, 1999) . As Garrahan and Ritchie note, a discernible economic development position was voiced in the region in response to the arrival from the mid-1980s, of major East Asian inward investment into the North East of England. During the decade and a half since then, an establishment position emerged that both presumed the benign qualities of such investment in steering economic growth and denied the utility of public debate. In this sense public and private sector approaches to economic development overlapped, and the dominant support for FDI went largely unquestioned in the region. (Garrahan and Ritchie, 1999, p. 8) Here, as Peck and Stone (1993) observed, Japanese firms were both the object and instrument of regional policies pursued by the Regional Development Agency (RDA) and its predecessor with the much vaunted 'demonstration effect' becoming an important ideological tool within the region. Japanese firms became the quoted examples . . . used to attract further inward investments; they became the models . . . of how indigenous industries should change; they became part of the justification . . . for altering the work practices in longer established plants; they became, in effect, part of a powerful ideology . . . . (Peck and Stone, 1993, p. 66) In this way, ideas surrounding the rehabilitative properties of East Asian FDI in the north-east of England became pervasive (Ritchie, 1999) .
Similarly, in Wales, academic commentary on the transformative role of overseas manufacturing investment has played its part in what Lovering (1999, p. 13 ) terms a dominant interpretation of the country's 'successful transition from . . . a structurally disadvantaged peripheral economy . . . to a new core of modern world-class high technology companies' (Lovering, 1999, p. 13) . The pervasiveness of such discourses can hardly be understated, since despite the acknowledged advantages enjoyed by, and success of, Welsh institutions in attracting inward investment, UK economic performance indicators place the Welsh economy only above Northern Ireland at the bottom of the regional league table.
In the US we find similar evidence of ways in which the successful attraction of inward investment has become an important means of promulgating particular territorial ideologies. Promotional materials produced by private and public agencies commonly draw on concrete inward investments in order to reshape discourses about particular regions and States. In the US South, for example, recent automobile investments by Japanese and German producers have been mobilized in States such as Mississippi, Alabama and South Carolina as evidence of the emergence and consolidation of a 'new' manufacturing belt. Meanwhile, in the 'old' manufacturing belt of the industrial Midwest inward investments had been similarly touted for their transformative potential in shaking off the region's 'rustbelt' image and demonstrating its ability to compete in national, and increasingly, global markets. In similar fashion to the north-east of England, Japanese investments in particular were widely touted, above and beyond their direct employment effects, as a means of restructuring work practices and supply chain management (Mair, 1993) .
Mechanisms of interest translation
As we saw earlier, there is a sense in which 'world models' (of, for example, neoliberal reforms) are promoted by transnational actors and collective bodies such as professional associations. However, the global regulatory and political ideological environment remain differentiated due to a variety of mechanisms-of which modelling is only one-through which regulatory principles are diffused. Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) identify coercion, systems of reward, modelling, reciprocal adjustment, non-reciprocal coordination and capacity-building as distinct mechanisms through which actors seek to incorporate their values and goals into global regulatory principles-some of which have served to enhance rather than reduce global regulatory standards (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2002, p. 296) .
Having said this, Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) highlight the extent to which states have become rule-takers rather than rule-makers, concluding that the principle of liberalization has won out decisively over that of strategic trade (although the practice is more complex) and that modelling is one of the most important mechanisms of global business regulation. Moreover, the mechanism of modelling more often proceeds from the spread of business practices to codification in regulatory rules than vice versa (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000, p. 551) . Indeed the spread of ideologies and practices assembled by local political coalitions to attract inward investment often display exactly this process of 'modelling' while multilocational firms themselves are important in spreading such practices. Not only do the key actors in inward investment regimes regularly benchmark themselves against each other such that certain IPAs have been identified as exemplar agencies (notably Singapore's Economic Development Board and Ireland's Industrial Development Agency), but also stories of successful capture circulate as models of investment promotion practice (Phelps, Power and Wanjiru, in press ). In the US league tables measuring success in the attraction of inward investment have been around since the 1960s and the professional literature draws on such tables to promulgate successful models for developing inward-investment centred development strategies. IOs, consultants and the like play a key role in circulating such best practice among the community of investment promotion professionals at national and international scales, although such models remain to be adapted to local circumstances.
Translating from the local to the global
We have argued that the idea of a TCC fails to recognize the complexity of scalar arrangements involved in animating globalization, effectively bracketing out interests and practices that span multiple geographical scales. Traditional frameworks for examining interest coalitions at subnational scales are subject to the same problems, albeit by a reverse practice of bracketing out interests of more global extent. The concept of the growth coalition draws attention to the manner in which a range of different private and public sector institutions and organizations share an interest in the fortunes of local economies by virtue of their 'local dependence' Mair, 1988, 1991) . Moreover, in defence of their various spaces of dependence, local organizations/institutions will construct and frequently enlarge the 'spaces of engagement' through which they connect to and enlist wider centres of social, economic and political power in order to realize their interests (Cox, 1998) .
The concept of the growth coalition emerged in a North American context in which business interests, and specifically those allied to land and property development, are important within local economies. While growth coalition accounts are rarely explicit about the geographic specificity of interests the assumption is that coalition interests are restricted to a common local or regional scale. These local or regional interests are then dependent upon channelling inward investment through a particular geographic space. Capital is accordingly either 'local' or 'non-local' in form. The extent to which these conditions are specific to the US case-and thus the portability of the growth coalition idea-is debatable (Harding, 1991 (Harding, , 1997 Wood, 2004 Wood, , 2005 . Part of the difficulty in applying growth coalition theory more widely rests in the binary nature of the division between local and non-local interests a distinction that becomes especially problematic in the case of inward investment where transnational capital is harnessed through territorial coalitions.
We have suggested elsewhere that a one-to-one correspondence between dependence and political engagement fails to exhaust the potential outcomes relating interests to political activity. Instead a range of relationships exists (Wood, 2004) (Figure 1 ). Growth coalition theory has directed attention to quadrant 1 in which a high level of local political engagement derives from high local dependence on the part of business interests. However, the territorial coalitions that develop around inward investment are often not locally dependent in the strong sense indicated by growth coalition theory. As such, quadrants 2 and 4 have barely been explored in the urban politics literature. Yet these scenarios pose important questions as to how and why business interests that are only weakly dependent on a local or regional economy become politically active.
We suggest that quadrants 2 and 4 are often associated with asymmetrical territorial coalitions in which the structural power of business interests is compounded by a weak sense of local dependence, which is also temporally limited. 5 Rather than position inward investment regimes as simply representing the interests of locally dependent fractions of capital we interpret their role as one of mediating or translating between territorially defined coalitions of interest and the geographically mobile nature of investments made by multilocational (and more often than not multinational) capital. Under these conditions the potential for conflict among actors and the interests they represent is magnified, as is the difficulty of coordinating interests into a discernible coalition. Moreover, the process of translation is influenced by the autonomy of local agents.
Mediating global-local conflict
One aspect that distinguishes inward investment regimes from existing concepts of local coalitions turns on the nature of conflicting interests among regime members, given the specific context of inward investment. In particular, we wish to highlight the coordinating role of organizations, which operate at broad subnational scales in mediating between coalition interests-notably the RDAs and other quasi-public agencies in the UK and Europe and State government Economic Development Departments and the investor-owned utilities in the US.
Beyond the territorial coalition itself, the literature on growth coalitions is largely silent on the micro-political structuring of local inter-organizational relations (Wood, 1993) . Given the fundamental difference in the scale and extent of local dependence of the likes of MNEs versus other local actors and given the speed of global economic integration, inward investment regimes draw attention to the importance of more mobile (and ostensibly transnational) elites in structuring processes of local coalition building. As Robinson and Harris note 'the struggle between descendent national fractions of dominant groups and ascendant transnational fractions has often been the backdrop to surface political dynamics and ideological processes in the late twentieth century. These two fractions have been vying for control of local state apparatuses since the 1970s' (Robinson and Harris, 2000, p. 23) . In the context of a national vacuum of neoliberal macroeconomic and FDI policies we would argue that this struggle is clearly manifest at the subnational scale. In the UK especially, although also in the US case, the older industrial regions individually and collectively serve as the key spaces of a process of modernization through inward investment.
The sorts of territorial coalitions that form around inward investment are reminiscent of Lipietz's (1994) notion of 'regional armatures'. Arguably the history of inward investment attraction, in the UK in particular, has seen older industrial regions converted, in Lipietz's terms, from 'spaces in themselves' into 'spaces for themselves' through the construction of specific institutional capacities that mobilize territorial ideologies congruent with the material interests of transnational capital. Territorial political coalitions are central to regional armatures through which regional spaces are institutionalized by elite regulation of conflictual social relations (Lipietz, 1994 ).
And such conflicts or differences among the constituents of territorial coalitions centred on inward investment are indeed apparent. 'For subnational state agencies, then, global networks support a focus on the region as their "key space of dependence", whilst the relationship is reversed for transnational capital with major TNCs using assets located within particular regions to meet global objectives' (MacKinnon and Phelps, 2001, p. 361) . These conflicts may be particularly pronounced since the information asymmetries between local organizations and globally mobile investors can be significant (Reid and Gatrell, 2003) . The transformative potential of inward investment serves as a discourse that has been routinely invoked with each new major inward investment. Yet, there are occasions when the sheer size of individual inward investments pits the interests of the particular inward investor against those of inward investors in general. The case of the LG investment illustrates the potential for individual companies, when their investments are of sufficient size, to distort local policy-making and lead to the mobilization of particular representations of the local economy and its social relations (Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones, 1998; . External representations in this case included dialogue with existing inward investors concerned about the poaching of labour. Here, then an important aspect of the coordinating role played by the likes of RDAs in the inward investment attraction and development process is one of balancing the interests of inward investors in general against those of particular investors. This mediating role, between general and particular inward investment interests, is important in a context in which the latter are needed by RDAs to establish and maintain credibility and where the consequent possibilities for 'corporate capture' are significant (Phelps and Fuller, 2001 ).
Coordinating the market for inward investment
It is increasingly common to position the competition for inward investment as a market in which a relatively limited number of governments compete to 'buy' investment from a larger population of sellers.
Yet this particular 'market' exhibits an interesting paradox (Thomas, 2000) . Although there are fewer governments than firms, the coordination failures are greater on the demand side than on the supply side (Thomas, 2000, p. 29-30) . Thomas treats the issue of competition for inward investment as an increasingly complex prisoners' dilemma of coordination for governments-given the number of governments competing and the increasing substitutability of potential investment locations. We would add that the complexity of this prisoners' dilemma is magnified by the proliferation of inward investment promotional agencies at national and, more significantly, subnational levels. 6 However, in the context of this article, the interesting point to note is the role that certain agents and institutions play as intermediaries or coordinating agents on behalf of inward investors in their dealings with local interests. Notable in this respect are quasi-state agencies such as the RDAs in the UK, business organizations such as chambers of commerce in the US, and, in both contexts, private location consultants who play a key role in transmitting and translating the material interests of transnational agents (especially MNEs) and associated ideological positions to other local institutions.
According to a recent survey by the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA, 2002, p. 30) , the most important organizations used as sources of site selection information were, in order: investment or merchant banks; large accountancy firms; national IPAs; and specialized site selection and general management consulting firms. The quantitative significance of the role of location consultants in investment decisions should not be overstated since one observer estimated that they were involved with no more than 10% of all new manufacturing plant location decisions (Spee, 2003) . This is in line with a UNIDO (2003, p. 50) survey of a selection of African nations where only 7% of inward investment inquiries came from intermediaries. While the extent of their influence seems to vary between and even within global regions their qualitative significance-in shaping prevailing norms regarding investment projects-is more certain. 7 The likes of location consultants act in a coordinating role by directing inward investment toward particular places and endorsing (or not as the case may be) particular government actions and policies (Wood, 1993; Thomas, 2000, p. 31) . Alongside a number of other professions such as lawyers and accountants, consultants represent 'rule intermediaries' (Majone, 1989 ) whose argument and persuasion help define the limits of regulations and norms in their application and subsequent revision. Moreover, Thomas argues that consultants play a pernicious role in bidding up the incentives gained by inward investors by adding their expertise to the pre-existing information asymmetry in negotiations between governments and firms over location decisions. One recent review of financial aid schemes operated in the UK went so far as to identify the emergence of a 'grants culture' (NAO, 2003) . Consultants can play this role since, whilst governments may be only partially cognizant of the level of grant aid necessary for a particular investment, companies may be only partially aware of or willing to negotiate the range of incentives available. Thus, as one interviewee speaking of the Welsh context noted, Unless you are very good . . . at knowing how the system works and how you can access funding, actually it's almost impossible to get the money. And that's where you get then the development of the brokering system where you get experts in grant applications. Perhaps they have more influence on business than business associations to a degree because those people are key movers if you like. [Interview 3] The same interviewee estimated that there were 30-50 such consultants in Wales alone.
Beyond this, different organizations play an important coordinating role within particular national contexts. So, for example, in the US it has been utility companies that have historically played the major role in coordinating the attraction of inward investment in manufacturing. Here, elements of cooperation or trust among economic development organizations are evident (Wood, 1993 (Wood, , 2003 . However, and crucially, trust is also enforced by the likes of utility companies and location consultants as coordinators of the inward investment attraction effort. Here, then, The utilities, or more accurately their ED [economic development] departments, play . . . a central coordinating role in the mediating process. They control particular site selection projects, alternately delegating responsibility to more local agents and internalizing it within their own operations. They build up local social infrastructures to facilitate delegation and exercise discipline over those agents whose cooperation is fundamental to the exercise and whose powers they cannot internalize. (Cox and Wood, 1997, p. 89) As one economic developer officer with a regional utility put it:
We try to work with the folks who are in office to get them orientated to what it means to be a force in economic development. Not infrequently we give presentations to new councils. We will sit down with city councils or village planning folks and we will, I guess the right word is, teach them economic development. [Interview 4] Moreover, their ability and desire to act as coordinating agents in this way also depends on the broader geographical scale at which they operate and thus their ability to command the territorial space in which other relevant local agents organize and operate.
In the European setting and in the UK in particular, quasi-government organizations such as RDAs provide another case in point. One face of the UK RDAs is imbued with a traditional public sector service ethos. The agencies are publicly funded and accountable and operationally bound by important state rules (for example, regarding expenditure and appointment of board members). The other face of RDAs is entrepreneurial in outlook. The increasing competition for mobile investment and interest in inward investment after-care issues has brought these agencies into ever-closer contact with private sector companies. Moreover, the increasing competition for mobile investment has seen promotional agencies in the UK and elsewhere in Europe refine their role as coordinating bodies, using sanctions and incentives to build 'enforceable trust' relations with other relevant agencies involved in local economic development. The 'Team Wales' approach through which the WDA orchestrated a hierarchically organized group of key agencies is an example that many English regions sought to emulate in the 1980s and 1990s. RDAs (in this case the WDA) sat alongside territorial arms of the state at the apex of a selective and hierarchically organized group of organizations mobilized in such a way as to address uncertainty for the investor and maximize the chances of securing a given project Tewdwr-Jones, 1998, 2001 ). An economic development officer references a similar hierarchical structure in the US context: Sometimes when you create teams I may have to bring in somebody on the team that is outside the realm of the ED circles that work together all the time . . . If I haven't worked with him before on this type of confidential situation I may be real nervous. You think, 'God, what's his confidentiality quotient? Can I trust him?' So I may work with him a little bit ahead of time and say, 'look I really need you, I'd like you to be involved in this but here are some ground rules'. [Interview 5] The institutional infrastructure surrounding the attraction of inward investment in both Europe and the US has expanded in recent years to include a range of government, quasi-government and private sector organizations. Yet, 'increased institutional breadth does not necessarily imply proportionate increase in complexity. Indeed there are senses in which shared management techniques, and political and cultural assumptions operating across institutions, may be associated with a degree of consistency in form and process' (Valler et al., 2000, p. 419) . We would argue that this is precisely the case with regards to local political coalitions centred on inward investment. The consistency of territorial ideologies centred on inward investment interests and thus, in part, their power, rests on a shared outlook, 'enforceable trust' (Cox and Wood, 1997) and normative behaviour that mitigates conflict and displaces alternative ideologies.
The autonomy of subnational institutions and globalization from below
The transmission of the material interests of MNEs to other institutions of local governance is more subtle than a simple case of 'corporate capture' produced from the creative capacities of corporations to acquire rights and shed responsibilities (Monbiot, 2000, p. 11) . Autonomous developments in the ethos of public service and the behaviour of quasi-public bodies, such as IPAs and other economic development organizations, creates pressure to bend or exploit rules to breaking point.
Considerable opportunity to test and bend rules exists in the non-transparent world of incentives schemes that proliferate at the state level within the US, with evidence that such practices have perverse effects elsewhere in state budgets (Graham, 2003) . Even in the more ordered incentives environment within the EU, significant opportunities exist to circumvent or bend aid rules. Indeed, the Commission has increasingly resorted to 'aid recovery measures' (whereby incentives are ruled illegal and recovered)-implying that its attempt to increase coordination of incentives offered by member states has been matched by acts of circumvention (Thomas, 2000, p. 230-238) . Despite having benefits in terms of coordination, attempts to codify treatment of investors can have perverse effects-focusing the creative attentions of governments, quasi-governmental organizations, consultants and firms upon loopholes or ambiguities. Much like international organizations can 'exercise power autonomously in ways unintended and unanticipated by states at their creation' (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, p. 699) , some of the same unintended sources of autonomous powers are available to subnational governments and quasi-governmental organizations. As such 'local actors do not remain passive targets and learners . . . [they] also promote norm diffusion by actively borrowing and modifying transnational norms' (Acharya, 2004) . Majone (1989) argues that even the autonomy of 'street-level bureaucrats' concerned with policy implementation can lead to the establishment of unintended norms regarding policy development. As such national and local states, quasi-state organizations, and location consultants all play a role in testing, bending and circumventing the rules governing the pursuit of inward investment. 8 Here, the pathologies of subnational organizations take their cue from their respective competition state ideologies.
9 A good example is provided by the arrival of the Korean company LG in South Wales Tewdwr-Jones, 1998, 2001; MacKinnon and Phelps, 2001) , which sparked considerable acrimony and allegations of 'rule-bending'. The LG case formed the backdrop to discussion with a senior member of staff at the WDA of grant aid packages assembled to attract major inward investors:
So if you sort of thought about it in terms of concentric fences . . . you'd want to do everything you possibly could in order to maximise your potential of winning that product . . . You would try and push the boundaries back as far as you can . . . and so do all the other regions in Europe. [Interview 6] Such conditions are by no means unique to Wales. Indeed the important differences in the finances at the disposal of the RDAs in the devolved territories (Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) compared with those in the English regions (Lee, 1999; Raines, 2000) appear to fuel rather than ease inter-locality competition for inward investment projects. 10 Similar evidence of what Prakash (2001) terms 'government dysfunctionalities' at the subnational scale are apparent in the north-east of England. The approach of RDAs as quasi-governmental bodies can at times come into open conflict with other local arms of the state. One respondent highlighted how the RDA intervened on the side of an inward investor in negotiations over financial incentives with the Government Office (a subnational arm of the state) resulting in the inflation of the eventual grant aid given to the investor [Interview 7]. Another described the process of attracting one major MNE to the north-east of England. yes rules were broken. I mean they were on the site before planning permission was given to be honest-that would never happen for a small development but what do you do when you desperately need these jobs . . .. [Interview 8] The same respondent went on to talk explicitly about the pressure his organization had placed on local authority planners in relation to this investment.
US parallels are striking, suggesting the generalization of a model in which economic development professionals mobilize on behalf of inward investors, and often in seeming opposition to other parties within local coalitions. In the Ohio case one local authority officer noted:
We've been receiving a lot of pressure in recent months from the Chamber, the business community and the utilities [saying], 'hey loosen up guys. There's a lot of people offering a lot more than you are and if you wanna stay in the league you're gonna have to loosen the purse strings a little bit'. [Interview 9] The subordinate role of local government within US economic development networks has been detailed elsewhere (Wood, 1993 (Wood, , 2003 Cox and Wood, 1997) . The important point to note here is an equivalent power of subnational institutions in mediating between inward investors on the one hand and a more localized set of interests on the other. That power rests much less in the command of resources at the local or regional scale than in the ability to orchestrate the process of globalization from below, translating across geographic scales of interest between transnational firms and local interests and agents.
10 The geographical scope of their overseas operations and the number of staff involved with inward investors directly has also continued to grow as agencies have built up a range of after-care programmes. Moreover, the resources devoted to serving inward investors can in turn become the subject of competition between agencies. At one point in the late 1990s a WDA internal briefing pointed to its International Division's lack of overseas staff compared to its major UK rival agencies (Phelps et al., 1999) .
The multiscalar, inter-organizational networks of translation
The picture we have painted in the preceding sections is one of regimes of interest that are simultaneously territorialized at a local scale and yet are also engaged with a wide array of interests at wider subnational, national and international scales. Thus, while such coalitions are territorialized it is also difficult to assign particular interests unequivocally to particular scales, such as the global or the local. As such, an understanding of inward investment regimes requires that we recognize the multiscalar networks that translate between the interests of transnational capital and more local interests. Moreover, these networks of power are increasingly diffuse in the further sense of being inter-organizational in nature.
The multiscalar nature of translation
The notion of local interests operating through wider spaces of engagement highlights the dynamic and variable geographic scope of territorial coalitions. That being the case, it is clear that coalitions centred on inward investors are less clearly bounded in geographical terms than traditional accounts of territorial coalitions would seem to allow. In contrast to growth coalition theory, for example, in which coalitions are seen to form at, and be bounded by, the local or urban scale, the idea of an inward investment regime can incorporate processes of coalition formation at broader subnational scales. The UK's older industrial regions have been characterized by reliance upon the attraction of inward investment from the inception of regional policy in the 1930s. Likewise in the US much of the post-1945 economic growth of the South and West has centred upon a similar mechanism of attracting inward investment, both from other US regions and, increasingly, internationally. Here, the interaction of neoliberal forms of regulation and inherited regional structures has produced distinctive politicaleconomic forms of organization and representation (MacKinnon and Phelps, 2001 ). In simple terms considerable resources have been spent on and institutional capacity developed around the servicing of inward investors.
More than this, however, the sort of territorial coalitions occupying quadrants 2 and 4 in Figure 1 are not merely formed at a broader subnational geographical scale than that suggested by growth coalition accounts but are, to a significant extent, variable and permeable. Indeed, the idea of a 'networked' rather than geographically bounded process of coalition and interest formation might be more useful in this regard (Wood, 2005) . To illustrate this point we can return to the example of LG's massive electronics manufacturing investment in South Wales. The capture of the LG investment necessitated the mobilization of promotional discourses across a range of different geographical scales. At the very local level of the town of Newport, 'mundane' public concerns regarding environment, noise, traffic and planning issues had to be addressed and ameliorated. At the broader geographic scale of South Wales, the project was won using an aid package that stressed the potential impact upon local communities with high levels of unemployment. And at a broader scale again the viability of the Welsh location had to be sold to the firm on the basis of important connections to the rest of the UK economy and beyond. From the point of view of the Welsh economy these connections might be considered 'leakages', yet these same links had to be downplayed in order to justify the level of grant aid given the investment's posited contribution to the 'regional' Welsh economy, and in light of public outcry at construction jobs going to 'outsiders' (Phelps and Tewdwr-Jones, 1998; . What this case illustrates is the way in which appeal to and integration of interests at multiple geographical scales is integral to the mobilization of ideology on the part of inward investment regimes. In light of this articulation of interests at multiple scales, it has been suggested that in the case of FDI, 'subnational regions or their representatives should be seen as transnational actors in their own right' (Aaron, 1999, p. 12) .
Organizational and occupational mobility
Occupational and organizational mobility of actors within territorial coalitions has produced a more subtle and pervasive mutuality of interests, albeit one in which those of transnational actors predominate. Most notably, this mutuality of interests transcends public and private sectors. Although territorial ideologies are seen to provide something of a common bond within growth coalition accounts, the concept tends to underplay the issue of occupational and organizational mobility as a means of generating a common discursive repertoire. The result is that, the expertise, credentials and interests of individuals and organizations are seen to be fleetingly coincident at the local level, for the purposes of realizing specific projects. Here, we suggest that the public versus private sector distinction is less significant than traditional accounts allow and that common practices and ideologies clearly serve to span and integrate actors and interests. On this point research into territorial coalitions might usefully incorporate insights from the service class literature.
One of the early developments and critiques of Goldthorpe's original work on the service class in the UK centred on its internal differentiation on the basis of assets such as housing, and more particularly managerial and professional credentials (Savage et al., 1992 ). Yet, the occupational and organizational mobility through which the service class is reproduced means that internal differentiation is a seemingly contradictory process. The idea of internal differentiation of a large middle or service class population is intuitively appealing yet as Goldthorpe (1995) has noted, if anything, there is an increasing homogeneity among professional and managerial components of the service class.
However, the lack of internal differentiation along professional/managerial lines need not preclude internal differentiation of the service class in terms of the particular capitalist class fractions served. Scott (1997) , for example, identifies several different fractions of the capitalist class (or in his terms 'capitalist class situations')-entrepreneurial (now largely a relic and characteristic of only a few branches of industry), rentiers, finance, and executives and directors. In the context of this article we would argue that the last of these-a fraction largely synonymous with mobile capital in the form of multilocational or multinational firms-has become increasingly significant as an axis for differentiating between elements of the service class.
More recently, Savage (2000) has reinserted the notion of agency into processes of service class formation and differentiation arguing that the meaning of 'career' and 'work' has been radically changed so that while historically manual workers had the autonomy to pursue their tasks and managers and professionals were servile dependents on their organisation, the restructuring of employment has turned these definitions around. The activities of managers and professionals are defined in terms of their ability to be 'entrepreneurial'. (Savage, 2000, p. 156) Here, then, we see signs of the struggle, 'over who legitimates the working practices and behaviour of professionals. Is it the professionals themselves, as it largely was in the past . . . or is it to be powerful actors such as the state and/or capital. . .' (Hanlon, 1998, p. 57) . Interest here has focused on the redefinition of professional credentials around the likes of entrepreneurialism and creativity (Rose, 1996; Florida, 2002) . As Rose suggests '. . . economic fates of citizens within a national territory are uncoupled from one another, and are now understood and governed as a function of their own particular levels of enterprise, skill, inventiveness and flexibility' (Rose, 1996, p. 339) .
Occupational and organizational mobility within inward investment regimes reflect this more general way in which international economic integration has created a blurring of professional and organizational identities as well as their geographical constitution-a case of 'MNCs and Wannabes' (Lovering, 2003) . As one recent account of processes of globalization has stressed, 'it may no longer be so easy to separate out functions between discrete entities, because all institutions and territorial configurations vie for a variety of powers as they and their jurisdiction become increasingly hybrid' (Amin, 1998, p. 155) . The servicing of inward investors provides a prime example of where occupational and organizational mobility reflect this hybridity-this redefinition of careers and credentials. Admittedly, our evidence here is anecdotal and speculative drawing on interviews covering a cross-section of public and private sector employees in the north-east of England and Wales in the UK and the Midwest of the US. Nevertheless, this evidence points to the increasingly entrepreneurial attitudes (usually skewed toward mobile investors) of public sector employees. There is also evidence of a flow of key personnel involved with inward investment across private and public sector organizations-a revolving door that links and integrates public and private spheres.
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In both Europe and the US, quasi-governmental bodies such as RDAs are important loci for the development of territorial coalitions for inward investment, directly representing the material interests of MNEs but also anchoring the occupational and organizational mobility that forms part of the process of regime formation. For a start, many key employees involved with attracting and providing after-care services to inward investors are recruited from private sector businesses. Anecdotal evidence from Wales also suggests that a small but steady stream of former RDA employees have gone on to work in private sector consultancy firms (which are in turn frequently involved with prospective investors) and to the university sector-highlighting the potentially important role of occupational and organizational mobility in generalizing and normalizing the discourses surrounding inward investors.
Conclusion
At an abstract level, this article has sought to emphasize the multiscalar nature of the political coalitions that orchestrate inward investment, and thus avoid the tendency to view the political economies of globalization as the displacement of one particular scale of organization by another. In this connection we have argued that insufficient attention has been paid to the complex ways in which occupational and organizational mobility interlock in the formation of territorial coalitions centred on attracting mobile capital or what we term inward investment regimes. A multiscalar understanding of these processes, focusing on the translation of interests between geographical scales provides one means of addressing this question.
Class analysis, in the form of ideas of global class formation that emphasize the structural position of transnational capital and the top-down imposition of generalized material and ideological practices proves to be too blunt an instrument to capture the concrete manifestation of territorial coalitions centred on inward investment. Such generalized structural processes have an uneven impact locally because of the diversity of actors involved, mechanisms of diffusion or translation and the referents around which such common practices and ideologies crystallize. Once we start to dissect inward investment regimes we find that they vary between national settings due to qualitatively different actors and their autonomous powers and the qualitatively different sorts of conflicts and opportunities for coordination among actors-producing what Acharya (2004) refers to as the localization of transnational norms.
Several variants of relational economic geography have emerged recently with arguably the most prominent centred on exploring the multiscalar global networks orchestrated by private sector actors such as MNEs (Yeung, 2005) . Our focus on political coalitions emerges out of the recent interest in the politics of scale but is also suggestive of significant links to the older relational tradition centred on the social relations of production (Massey, 1984) . Not only have certain areas in the UK and the US come to play specific roles within wider divisions of labour but also they frequently remain in relations of dominance and subordination with activities in other areas. The analysis of an important set of interlocutors in the process of economic globalization-what we here have termed inward investment regimes-has, we believe, something to offer in uncovering such economic geographies of power relations and associated inequalities.
These concerns are therefore hardly of less significance for democratic processes and the question of policy development. In the competition state model (Cerny, 1997) , the economy and associated regulatory and legal institutions represent sites of power that have become increasingly disconnected from democratic processes. As such the need to democratize economic practices and activities becomes a critical political project (Held, 1995, p. 265 ). Some of the major challenges for cosmopolitan democracy centre on the progressive re-regulation of new 'sites of power' (Held, 1995) including those manifest at the subnational scale. Such subnational political coalitions can be characterized by what Held terms 'nautonomic structures', since social stratification is one of the chief means by which rules and resources shape social action through established patterns of power and authority. In this context there is evidence of a real need for re-regulation or, at minimum, improved mechanisms of coordination. In its absence the hope of 'drawing down of benefits from companies into the social and economic life of a place in environmentally sensitive ways' (Healey, 1997, p. 202 ) is likely to remain a largely forlorn one.
